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On Science and Social Science 
HERE are many definlitiom of science, 
and these are commonly based on 
literarv and social usage rather than on the 
technical problem of &stinguish;ng differ- 
ent areas of scholarship. To evolve an 
adeaualte definition we shall a t e m ~ t  to 
extract common elements from physics, 
biology, chemistry, geology, and aistron- 
omy, from those fields which are com- 
monly called sciences. Any accep~ble 
definition of science must be equally ap- 
plicable to all of these, to all the natural 
sciences. To speak in the usual meaapbr, 
we shall mempt a "scienlrific" definimtion 
of science. 
All the natural sciences are organized 
and systematic. Is system the chlaracter- 
istic of science? The words "science" and 
"scientific" are often used as though they 
were synonymous with "system" and "sys- 
tematic." Thus classi6a~tim and orpan- 
izaaion have been thought to gge&a~e 
"Library Science." Ya chere are vast dif- 
ferences in the extent to which our mmo- 
type sciences have beem systematized, as 
related to their complexi~ies, alnd I think 
there will be no disagreement with the 
statemenlt tha't svstem is not a fundamental 
aspect of science and thw system alone 
cannot serve as a basis for definition. Or- 
ganized knowledge is not of itself scientific 
knowledge. 
The natural sciences are empirical; their 
instrumentation requires ingenuity, inven- 
tiveness, and craft, and this has fathered 
another popular usage of "science." Boxing 
has given way to boxing science; barbering 
to barber science; the type shop has been 
transformed iln att least one college to the 
typography laboratory. No, d s b r y ,  in- 
ventiveness, and originality all describe a 
broader arena than that of the natural 
sciences, and not even systematic craft is 
science. 
Is there a method which characterizes 
the sciemces? The so-called "scientific 
me~hod" is generally thought to include 
steps such as observation, induction, and 
prediction. Y a the literature abounds 
with definitions of the schitific method, 
and their very multiplicity d~iscloses ehat 
there is no uniaue melthod bv which the 
data and theor& of science ire -obtz;led, 
and the sciendc method may be mare 
aiccura~tely described as the mold into 
which scientists cast their ~ublisherd papers 
than as the recipe for achieving knowl- 
edge. As Holmnl has said, ". . . in formal- 
izing an individual con~ribution for ~ u b -  
" 
lication, lit is part of the game . . . to make 
the resuks in retrospect appear neatly de- 
rived from clear fundarmentails. . . . 
Months of tortuous, wasteful effort mav 
be hidden bhtind a few elegant 
with the sequence of presented develop- 
ment running directly opplosite to the 
actual chronology, to che confusion of 
students and historians alike." That e h m  
is no method common to the sciences be- 
coma acuhelv evident when we observe 
that t h  geol&ia would be forced to pre- 
dict future geologic structures in spite of 
the disparity between geologic and human 
time scales, that simple morphology, which 
simply describes organisms but does not 
aitcempt to generate new hws or predict 
new facts. would be m unscientl%c aotivirtv 
for the biob&, if we forced these stud& 
to conform ;b the "scientific method'' in 
1 .  Gerald Holton, American Scientist, 41 (1953), 89. 
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order to qualify for their claim to scien- 
tific status. We must reject the use of a 
common metlhod as the basis for the defini- 
tion of science, for it is now a truism &at 
there is no method common to the natural 
sciences. Systematized observa~tion, induc- 
tion, and prediction do not charwterize 
the sciences uniquely. 
What then are the fundlamental char- 
acteristics which lure at the basis of uhe 
actlivities of all the natural sciences and 
without which they could not exist? The 
most pertinent of these is the public char- 
acter of scientific data. All "standard ob- 
servers" properly situated must be capable 
of identifying the "same" event and of 
reporting it in the same way. As William 
EarleZ has said, the ". . . standa~rd observer 
I 'anyone,' anyone, (that is, whose senses 
are sound and whose mind is not halluci- 
nated." The empirical data of science must 
be accessible to all. Since i t  is thege dlata 
that all inductions muslt follow, and to 
which all theories mus~t ultimately return, 
it is upon the public chaacter of the 
nature of its data that any definition of 
science must rest. At its empirical founda- 
tion science need not be logical, it need 
not be mathematical, but als an irreducible 
minimum, science must be public. This 
stipulation is certainly not inclusive; all 
public even'ts are not necessarily science. 
Rather, the requirement that the data be 
public is meant to be exclusive. No private 
datum or collection of such data can be 
said to conatiltute a science. 
The data of the psychothwapist are 
wholly private. There is onily one observer, 
the patient himmsdf. The inner structure 
of the mind is wholly privaite and is not 
and can never be equally visible to all 
"standard observers." At bewt, it is the 
role of the therapist to help the observer 
I Ions. make and interpret his own observat' 
What there is to see can be seen only by 
rhe patient. A science of psychotherapy 
is a logical impossibility. A similar prob- 
lem is faced by the sociologis~t whose basic 
datum is testimony. 'While testimony can 
2. William Earle, Ethics, 63 (1953), 293. 
be counted, no observer can say whether 
the testimony is true, four the correlation 
between an individual's t e s ~ i m n y  and his 
belief can be known only to tohe testator. 
In so highly cbarged an area as sexual be- 
havior, the assertion that even freely given 
testimony is truly represenwtiw of past 
experiences has been vigorously debated. 
While it is generally recognized that the 
collection of testimony is subject to such 
criticism, there seems to be an underlying 
and untestable belief in the social sciences 
that the disparity between testimony and 
truth is as o f~en  positive as negative, and 
that on the average truth is attained. As 
difficult as is the problem of relacing testi- 
mony to truth for the living, the same 
problem for the dead is truly b s u l o u n t -  
able. Chronicle is undeniably public a ~ d  
is available to all historians, but imwrp'reta- 
tive history in which untestified motives 
are attributed to individuals, to groups, 
and to entire nations centainly must lie 
outside the pale of anything even meta- 
phorically called "historical science." Simi- 
lar objections pertain to claims of a "sci- 
ence of esthetic criticism," a "scientific 
psychology of art or music." Some psycho- 
logical research attempts to relate private 
expe~iences like loudness or brightness to 
public stimuli called sound intensity or 
light intensity, and is subject to the same 
challenge, thfat its data are nm public and 
caninw be made public through testimony. 
A second characteristic common to ohe 
sciences is their subject matter. Their com- 
mon subject is nature, a subjee matter 
quite public and accessible to the stmdard 
observer. Nature may be disturbed or 
altered by th act of observ~tion, bug 
never by the fact th'at man is the observer. 
The organization of the sciences is in part 
dbe to the genius of the scien&t, but in 
hrger measure to the organization of na- 
ture itself. From the point of view of the 
scientist the system~dc, logical, mathe- 
matical, predictable character of his sub- 
ject is the sheerest accident. If nature ware 
ianciful the scientist w0111d study its 
fancy. But nature is not capricious and 
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there is ample evidence presently available 
that the consistency of nazure is expressible 
in "natural law," that the descripoion of 
the world is cumula~ive and continually 
grows more accurate, for it is a relatively 
stable nature that is studied by successive 
observers. The phases of Venus discovered 
by Galileo some three hundred years ago 
are even better known today; the electron's 
charge measured by Wlikan some fifty 
years ago is considerably more accurately 
known today. 
While the non-public datum of the 
social studies is clearly excluded from the 
category of science, there remains a vast 
body of material in which the dhta are 
public. The student of eamomics deals 
with caxloadings, market receipits, bank 
deposits, and so on. Such studies are 
founded on the proposition that lawful 
behavior is characteristic of man and his 
in~stitutions, and that only the you)& of 
his enterprise is responible for che inability 
of the scholar to display the analogues of 
Newton's laws of motion. Yet it is an 
empty argument that man has studied 
man for a shorter time than he has studied 
nacure. I h e  scholar looks back upon a 
history of his subject from which no sig- 
nificant natural law hats emerged and ex- 
trapolates to a future in wh~ich the laws 
of human behavior are propounded in 
every textbook. There is an interesting 
and subtle conflict between $he faith of 
the socis1 scientist in an inflexibly lawful 
behavior (which remains mly to be dis- 
covered), and the nature of the social 
structure which he studies. Certainly there 
could be no society if human behavior 
were completely indeterminate, yet human 
behavior as well determined as the trajec- 
tory of a rifle bullet makes a farce of such 
vital social institutions as the judiciary. 
Carried to its relentless conclusions the 
concept of "scientifically" lawful human 
behavior assumes a predestined future in 
which there can be neither reward nor 
punishment and in which the concept of 
personal responsibility is a mockery. 
What can be wrong with the use of the 
ward "science" in the context of the social 
studies? According ao RichfieldY3 the 
question of the scientific status of psycho- 
analysis is important because of the eulo- 
gistic function or emotive significance of 
the term "science." "It seem to be as- 
sumed that to question the scientific status 
of an activity is equivalent to asking 
whether ahat activity is desirable, reliable 
or valid." For $he purposes of the present 
discussion the question of value is to  be 
divorced from the question of the scien- 
tific character of the social studies. There 
can be no doubt thait the e d y  of man is 
worthy and desirable. Nor is she present 
discussion to be interpreted as an assertion 
thatt the social studies cannot be objective. 
All subjects may be treated objectively, 
the social studies, es,hetics, and religion 
not excepted. In science the interpretation 
of data, the formul~tion of concepts, the 
vehemence w$th which an argument is 
propounded are cwminly tainted with per- 
sonal bias. Yet tlhe question of subjectivity 
does not arise in the sciences, for all data 
must ultimately reside in nature, not in 
man. In fact, if the question of subjectivity 
or objectilvity is a meaningful one in a 
particular context, then chat context can- 
not appropriately be called science. 
No, the objection to the application of 
the word "scienceyy to the social studies 
lies in the fact that in patterning them- 
selves after the sciences the social studies 
have tended to reject insighas which cannot 
be expressed quantitatively and statisti- 
cally. In some areas it seems co be con- 
sidered unprofessional m study man in 
ways which are not likely to yield tabular 
data and graphs. Primary decisions as to 
what research can be undertaken and 
secondary decisions as to experimental de- 
sign are distorted by a straitjacket of form 
built from the specifications of an alien 
scholarship. Within a11 of the social studies 
there are conflicts between the "more sci- 
entific" and ahe "less scientific" schools, 
and the worst epithet which can be applied 
to another's work appears to be "unscien- 
3. J. Richfield, Scientific Montbly, 29 (1954), 306. 
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tific." In the light of the present &us- ing rather than dividing the studies of 
sion such debates are pdcularly fruitless. ma~n, and avoiding the self-imposed 
perhaps2a new symbol is needed, generated blinders which must be donned by the 
from the content of the social studies, unit- socifal student turned social scientist. 
